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Abstract
The paper summarises previous theories of accident causation,
human error, foresight, resilience and system migration. Five lessons
from these theories are used as the foundation for a new model which
describes how patient safety emerges in complex systems like health-
care: the System Evolution Erosion and Enhancement model. It is con-
cluded that to improve patient safety, healthcare organisations need to
understand how system evolution both enhances and erodes patient
safety. 
Background
All too often, the response when a doctor, nurse or allied healthcare
professional makes a mistake is to blame and punish. Healthcare pro-
fessionals who make errors are often viewed as being careless, culpa-
ble and are subject to disciplinary action.1
This approach, known as the person-centred approach to human
error,1 commonly prevails in healthcare systems around the world. It
does not improve patient safety. The person-centred model of human
error is linked to two myths that we must eradicate if we want to make
healthcare systems safer; the punishment myth and the perfection
myth.1 The punishment myth relates to the belief that if we punish
healthcare professionals who make mistakes they will be more careful
in the future and make fewer errors.1 The perfection myth is the belief
that if people try hard enough they will not make errors.1 It is based on
the assumption that error-free performance is attainable and is some-
thing doctors, nurses and allied healthcare professionals can achieve
if they are more vigilant. Evidence from cognitive psychology and
human factors research shows us that the expectation of error-free
performance is unrealistic.2,3 Human performance is shaped by the
context in which it occurs; factors like task and process design, cul-
ture, teamwork and environmental conditions all influence human
performance.2,4
Research on accident causation and landmark publications on med-
ical error,2,3 including To error is human in the United States and an
Organization with a Memory in the UK,5,6 have advocated that it is
important to understand how healthcare systems fail, rather than sim-
ply focusing on individual healthcare professionals who make errors.
The article discusses previous models of accident causation,2,3 human
error,2,3,7,8 foresight,9,10 resilience engineering and system migra-
tion.11-13 Five lessons from these previous theories are identified and
a new framework for understanding safety is presented: the System
Evolution Erosion and Enhancement (SEEE) model.
The systems approach to accident causation
The systems approach is encapsulated in Reason’s Swiss Cheese
model of accident causation.2,3 The model states that in any system
there are many levels of defence but these defences are imperfect both
because of inherent human fallibility and weaknesses in how systems
are designed and operated.
Reason’s model distinguishes between active failures and latent
conditions.2,3 Active failures are errors and violations that are commit-
ted by people at the service delivery end of the healthcare system (e.g.,
the ward nurse, the pharmacist,, the general practitioner, the operat-
ing room team, the psychiatric nurse etc.). Active failures by these
people may  have an immediate impact on safety. 
Latent conditions result from poor decisions made by the higher
management in an organization, e.g. by regulators, governments,
designers, and manufacturers. Latent conditions lead to weaknesses
in the organization’s defences, thus increasing the likelihood that
when active failures occur they will combine with existing precondi-
tions, breach the system’s defences, and result in an organizational
accident. Latent conditions and active failures lead to windows of
opportunity in a system’s defences. When these windows of opportuni-
ty are aligned across several levels of a system, an accident trajectory
is created (Figure 1). The accident trajectory is represented by the
penetration of the levels of defence by an arrow. The holes represent
latent and active failures that have breached successive levels of
defence. When the arrow penetrates all the levels of defence, an
adverse event (a death or patient harm) occurs.2,3
Swiss cheese and medical incident investigation
Incident investigations based on the Swiss Cheese model identify
how latent conditions and active errors combine to lead to patient
harm. The latent conditions and active failures that have been identi-
fied from investigations of intrathecal vincristine medication inci-
dents in healthcare are summarised below.6,9,14
Significance for public health
The article identifies lessons from previous theories of human error and
accident causation, foresight, resilience engineering and system migration
and introduces a new framework for understanding patient safety in health-
care; the System Evolution, Erosion and Enhancement (SEEE) model. The
article is significant for public health because healthcare organizations
around the world need to understand how safety evolves and erodes to devel-











Latent conditions: i) unclear or inaccessible chemotherapy policies
and procedures. For example, policies where it was not made clear that
intravenous vincristine and intrathecal methotrexate should not be
given in the same clinical  location on the same day. ii) A hierarchical
organizational culture in which nurses and pharmacists felt unable to
challenge the unsafe practice of consultants. iii) The design of spinal
connectors (which allowed a vincristine syringe to be attached to a
spinal connector). iv) Poor induction practices for junior doctors
whereby doctors were allowed to circumvent the intrathecal medicine
induction training because of production pressures on the ward. v) A
culture characterized by convergence of benevolence where staff rou-
tinely broke rules to meet patient needs and to ensure that treatment
was administered as closely to chemotherapy protocols as possible.9
Active failures: i) checking errors by hospital pharmacists which
allow vincristine to be sent to a clinical area at the same time
methotrexate is scheduled to be administered to a patient; ii) checking
omissions or failures by the junior doctors means that they do not iden-
tify they are about to administer vincristine intrathecally (when it
should only be administered intravenously).
Beyond Swiss Cheese
The Swiss Cheese model has been used as the theoretical basis for
developing other models of incident causation (for example,
Helmreich’s threat and error management model in aviation) and inci-
dent investigation tools in healthcare [(for example, the London proto-
col and Prevention Recovery Information System for Monitoring and
Analysis (PRISMA)-Medical (PRISMA-Medical)].15-17 The distinction
between active and latent failures has strongly influenced efforts to
understand the causes of error and incident investigation for the last
two decades, both in healthcare and other industries. Its dominance
has prevailed even though Reason himself has developed newer mod-
els aimed at understanding human error in complex systems. For
example, the three buckets model and the harm absorbers model,9,10
both which recognise that healthcare professionals often use intuition,
expertise and foresight to anticipate, intervene and prevent patient
harm.9,10 In this sense, doctors, nurses and allied healthcare profes-
sionals are the last line of defence in the healthcare system.9,10
The old versus the new view of human error
Some critics have argued that, although well-intentioned, in prac-
tice, the Swiss Cheese Model, leads to a linear approach to incident
investigation: in what has been termed the old view of human error,
efforts are made to trace back from active errors to identify organisa-
tional failures without recognising the complexity of systems like
healthcare and aviation.7,8
Dekker distinguishes between the old view and the new view of
human error.7,8 He argues that the old view of human error, where
there is a search for organisational deficiencies or latent failures, sim-
ply causes us to relocate the blame for incidents upstream to senior
managers and regulators. This was recently evidenced in the United
Kingdom National Health Service in the Francis Inquiry report into the
deaths of patients at Mid Staffordshire hospital.18 There was signifi-
cant focus in both the inquiry report and in subsequent media coverage
on the lapses by healthcare regulators that led to delays in intervening
to prevent patients being harmed. As a result of the findings of the
Francis Inquiry and other high profile national incident reports, the
NHS’s key regulator, the Care Quality Commission, has come under
intense media scrutiny. Dekker’s argument that blame is simply attrib-
uted further upstream seems, to some extent, to have been borne out
by Mid Staffordshire.
Dekker advocates that a new view of human error is needed which
views safety as an emergent property of a system in which there are
numerous trade-offs between safety and other goals, (for example, pro-
duction pressures).7,8 Other theorists have also recognised that safety
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is an emergent property in complex systems, including proponents of
resilience engineering.11,12
Resilience engineering
Resilience is the ability of individuals, teams and organisations to
identify, adapt and absorb variations and surprises on a moment by
moment basis.11 Resilience engineering recognises that complex sys-
tems are dynamic and it is the ability of individuals, teams and organ-
isations to adapt to system changes that creates safety. Resilience
moves the focus of learning about safety away from What went wrong?
to Why does it go right?.12
Case study examples of how healthcare teams create resilience in
emergency departments and operating theatres have been published.19-21
For example, Patterson described how collaborative cross checking
occurs in teams and that this is a resilience strategy used by teams to
maintain safety.20
One key concept from resilience engineering is the distinction
between Safety 1 and Safety 2.12 In healthcare, safety has traditionally
been defined by its absence. That is to say, we learn how to improve
safety from investigating past events like incidents, complaints. This is
known as Safety I.12 In contrast, Safety II focuses on the need to learn
from what goes right. It involves exploring the ability to succeed when
working conditions are dynamic.12 Safety II involves looking at good
outcomes, including how healthcare organisations adapt to drifts and
disturbances from a safe state and correct them before an incident
occurs. In healthcare, we rarely learn from what goes right because
resources are solely invested into learning from what goes wrong.
However, serious incidents occur less frequently than instances of
Safety II (which are numerous).12 Hence focusing on what goes right
would provide an opportunity to about events that occur frequently, as
opposed to rarely. 
Migration to system safety boundaries 
Amalberti’s system migration model is also relevant to understand-
ing medical errors in healthcare.13 Amalberti postulates that humans
are naturally adaptable and explore their safety boundaries. A combina-
tion of life pressures, perceived vulnerability, belief systems and the
trade-off between these factors versus perceived individual benefits
leads people to navigate through the safety space:
Amalberti differentiates between:13 i) the legal space, i.e. prescribed
behaviour; ii) the illegal-normal space, where people naturally drift
into depending on situational factors and personal beliefs; iii) the ille-
gal-illegal space; which brings people into an area of that is unsafe and
where the probability of an accident occurring is greatly increased.
In healthcare, the legal-space is defined by policies, procedures and
guidelines that describe standards of safe practice. Frequently, when
serious incidents occur, non-compliance with policies and procedures
is identified as a root cause. All too often hindsight bias comes into play
in the investigation process and too little consideration is given to the
situational factors that led to non-compliance. Hindsight bias occurs
when an investigator,22 who is looking backwards after an incident has
occurred, judges the behaviour of those involved unfairly because with
the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see the alternative courses of
action that could have been taken which would prevent the incident
from occurring. 
In one study exploring procedural non-compliance in healthcare, a
ward sister who had been disciplined following a drug error that led to
serious harm to a patient was interviewed.23 The hospital had recently
amended its Medication policy for the drug involved in the incident,
reverting back to a double-checking procedure from single checking by
a nurse prior to medication administration. The ward sister was
unaware the Medication policy had been changed and did not involve
another nurse in the checking process before administering the drug
to the patient. As a result, she was disciplined, partly because hindsight
and outcome bias in the incident investigation process meant that the
lead investigator did not look into how the changes to the medication
policy was communicated to nursing staff and whether other nurses
were unaware of the changes to the checking procedure.23
Five lessons about safety and accident causation
Table 1 summarises five lessons from the theories that have been
summarised in the article. It is postulated that future theories of safe-
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Table 1. Five key lessons from previous theories of accident causation, human error, foresight, resilience and system migration.
What is the lesson to learn? Source
Lesson 1: a combination of systems and human factors can enhance or erode safety. Swiss Cheese, Three buckets and harm absorber models
Lesson 2: systems are dynamic: they evolve over time and spring nasty surprises. Three buckets and harm absorber models; 
Healthcare professionals, teams and organisations sometimes successfully anticipate Resilience engineering; Safety 1 versus Safety 2
and manage these nasty surprises, and sometimes they do not. 
Lesson 3: safety is an emergent property of the system which needs to be understood The old and new view of human error; Resilience engineering
in the context of trade-offs with other competing goals 
(for example, in healthcare, meeting efficiency targets, making financial savings 
and ensuring continuity of the service).
Lesson 4: hindsight bias, together with the human tendency to attribute blame The old and new view of human error; Safety 1 versus Safety 2
and the fact that serious incidents occur less frequently than successful outcomes 
limits what we can learn from taking human error as our starting point and tracing 
backwards to identify the causes of what went wrong. We therefore need to balance 
our focus and learn from what goes right rather than being preoccupied 
with learning from what goes wrong.
Lesson 5: humans migrate and explore the system’s safety boundaries. System migration
The extent to which they do this depends upon a combination of factors 










ty need to take account of these five lessons in order to develop models
and frameworks that capture the complexity of safety in healthcare.
Without an under-pinning theoretical framework that captures how
safety is a complex, dynamic phenomenon, healthcare organisations
around the world will not understand the different facets of safety that
emerge as healthcare systems evolve over time.
The Safety Evolution Erosion andEnhancement model
The five lessons summarised in Table 1 are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows the underlying processes that healthcare organisations
need to appreciate to understand safety as a complex, dynamic process.
It shows how system evolution impacts on safety both positively and
negatively by causing both erosion and enhancement. Figure 2 shows
that both systems-level, team and individual human factors can
enhance or erode safety in healthcare (i.e. Lesson 1). Figure 2 aims to
show that any system, whether it is a healthcare system, aviation, off-
shore oil and gas, banking or other complex sociotechnical system nat-
urally evolves over time (i.e. Lesson 2). System evolution is caused by
many different types of factors including the introduction of new tech-
nology, innovations in healthcare procedures, organisational restruc-
turing or mergers, staff retention and recruitment, patient pathway and
process re-design, the context and focus of external regulators, cultur-
al change, equipment maintenance and IT upgrades, production, effi-
ciency and safety performance targets, and the economic climate.
System evolution also occurs as a result of the natural human tenden-
cy to explore safety boundaries (i.e. Lesson 5) (Figure 2).
Enhancement and erosion
System evolution can have both positive and negative effects on
safety. In terms of positive effects, system evolution can lead to safety
enhancement. Enhancement occurs when system evolution strength-
ens in-built defences, barriers and safeguards or where it improves the
ability of individuals and teams to anticipate and respond when nasty
surprises occur. By recognising that safety enhancement results from
system evolution, Figure 2 illustrates the importance for healthcare
organisations of learning from what goes right (i.e. Safety II; Hollnagel
2012; i.e. Lesson 4), rather than only learning from what goes wrong.
System evolution can also lead to erosion, where defences, barriers
and safeguards are weakened or where the ability of teams and individ-
uals to identify, intervene and thwart emerging safety threats is nega-
tively affected (Figure 2).
The central tenet of the SEEE model is that in order to effectively
manage safety, healthcare organisations need to understand the rela-
tionship between system evolution and enhancement and erosion.
Hence we need to recognise that safety is an emergent property of the
system and that it needs to be understood in context of how it is bal-
anced against other competing goals like production and efficiency tar-
gets (i.e. Lesson 3). 
All too often, as other authors have previously stated, healthcare
organisations carry out a forensic analysis of what went wrong after an
incident occurred.7,8,11,12 As shown in Figure 2, this is equivalent to try-
ing to understand and improve safety by looking through a microscope
whose lens is focused on understanding safety erosions in isolation. As
other authors have previously stated, this type of approach means we
miss opportunities to learn from what goes right.12 Another way of
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understanding this problem is with reference to the recent measuring
and monitoring safety framework developed by Vincent, Burnett and
Carthey.24 The measurement framework (Figure 3) comprises five
dimensions, all of which are important for the effective monitoring and
management of safety: i) Past harm: has patient care been safe in the
past? This involves assessing rates of past harm to patients, both phys-
ical and psychological. ii) Reliability: are our clinical systems, process-
es and behaviour reliable? This is the reliability of processes and sys-
tems in organisations but also the capacity of the staff to follow safety
critical procedures. iii) Sensitivity to operations: is care safe today?
This is the information and capacity to monitor safety on an hourly or
daily basis. We refer to this as sensitivity to operations. iv) Anticipation
and preparedness: will care be safe in the future? This refers to the abil-
ity to anticipate, and be prepared for, threats to safety. V) Integration
and learning: are we responding and improving? The capacity of an
organisation to respond, assimilate, learn and improve from, safety
information.
Healthcare organisations who only focus on learning about system
erosion invest time and resources learning from past harm and some
elements of reliability without paying sufficient attention to the other
dimensions of the measurement and monitoring framework (i.e. sensi-
tivity to operations, anticipation and preparedness, integration and
learning). 
Understanding safety emergence
The SEEE model is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows how system
evolution leads to both erosion and enhancement. Importantly, it also
shows the zone of safety emergence. This is the area where positive
and negative effects of system evolutions need to be anticipated and
understood in order to manage safety effectively. The SEEE model pos-
tulates that how well healthcare organisations manage safety critically
depends on their ability to anticipate and understand emerging ero-
sions and enhancements to safety that occur as the healthcare system
evolves. Rather than using the old view of error to learn safety lessons,
we need to develop methods that provide insights into the relationship
between system evolution, erosion and enhancement. Most important-
ly, future methods to learn and improve safety need to focus on what is
happening in the zone of safety emergence, rather than retrospective-
ly trying to learn after incidents have occurred. This approach all too
often leads to an exclusive focus on the process of erosion.
Conclusions
To improve patient safety, there is a need to learn lessons from past
theories of accident causation, human error, foresight, resilience and
system migration and to develop theoretical models which describe
safety as a complex, multi-faceted and dynamic phenomenon. By devel-
oping an under-pinning theoretical framework that captures the com-
plexity of safety evolution, erosion and enhancements, healthcare
organizations around the world can be educated and supported to
understand the true complexity of monitoring and measuring patient
safety.
Review
Figure 3. Measurement and monitoring of safety framework.
Figure 4. The System Evolution, Erosion and Enhancement
model of safety.
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